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BUILDING CHINESE WALLS IN VIRGINIA: SHOULD VIRGINIA
RECOGNIZE THE CHINESE WALL DEFENSE TO VICARIOUS
DISQUALIFICATION?
I. A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE WALL
Consider the following situation:
[Y]our firm ... is interested in hiring as an associate an attorney who was
previously employed as an Assistant County Attorney in a county near the
office where the attorney is to work .... [T]his attorney has significant ex-
perience acquired while employed by the county in types of matters in
which your firm is engaged and . . . the attorney has been substantially
involved in an ongoing lawsuit arising out of a land use matter. Your firm
has been representing plaintiffs in that action and intends to continue that
representation after hiring the former Assistant County Attorney.
You have [concerns about] the propriety of your firm's continued represen-
tation of your plaintiff clients after hiring this attorney, in light of the for-
mer Assistant County Attorney's prior representation of the county adverse
to your clients.1
This situation is not one found only in a law school hypothetical ethics
question; it is a real life professional dilemma. A firm in this position may
be vicariously disqualified from representing its clients because the for-
mer government attorney cannot participate in the representation.2
Under circumstances such as these, the American Bar Association (ABA) 3
and many jurisdictions4 do not require the firm to be automatically dis-
qualified, provided the firm erects effective procedures and safeguards to
completely screen the attorney from participating in the matter.5 These
procedures have come to be known as a "Chinese wall." Virginia, on the
other hand, has not formally recognized the Chinese wall as a defense to
1. Virginia State Bar Standing Committee on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1302 (1989)
(withdrawn after being disapproved by the Supreme Court of Virginia on September 12,
1990) [hereinafter Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1302].
2. Id. at 2; see infra notes 32-69 and accompanying text for discussion of individual and
vicarious disqualification.
3. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 (1989) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES]. Rule 1.11 is discussed infra page 12.
4. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other
grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977);
Kovacevic v. Fair Automotive Repair, 641 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
5. See MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.11 (stating that the disqualified attorney must
be "screened from any participation in the matter."); Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1302,
supra note 1, at 4.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
automatic vicarious disqualification. In its Legal Ethics Opinion 1302,'
the Virginia State Bar Standing Committee on Legal Ethics, commenting
on the exact situation outlined above, expressed support for the Chinese
wall defense in limited circumstances.7 However, the Supreme Court of
Virginia, without an opinion, disapproved Legal Ethics Opinion 1302 and
the opinion was withdrawn."
A Chinese wall is essentially a screening mechanism set up within an
institution to act as an "impermeable barrier to intrafirm exchange of
confidential information."9 To prevent inadvertent "leakage" of confiden-
tial information, a number of precautions may be taken, including the
establishment of organizational and physical structures designed to sepa-
rate those who possess information from those who should not have it.'"
Although of relatively new use in the legal profession, this type of "wall"
is not new. Banks and securities firms, in an effort to protect their clients'
financial confidences, routinely erect Chinese walls.1
In recent years, as law firms grow larger and attorneys frequently move
both among firms and between the public and private sectors in an effort
to find more interesting work or better compensation, the use of Chinese
walls in law firms has become increasingly important. 2 As attorneys
change jobs, it is possible for them to run afoul of the ethical guidelines
requiring attorneys "to protect a client's confidences and secrets, to serve
a client with undivided loyalty, and to avoid even the appearance of im-
propriety."'" For example, an attorney may find that his new firm is rep-
resenting a client who has interests adverse to those of a client that he or
his former associates, whether in another firm or with the government,
have previously represented." A former government lawyer may move
into private practice and discover that his firm is involved in a "matter in
6. Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1302, supra note 1.
7. Id. The Committee expressly noted that its "opinion [was] intended to be limited to
situations involving a former government lawyer accepting employment with a private firm
dealing with civil matters .. " Id. at 6.
8. Telephone Interview with Susan B. Spielberg, Assistant Bar Counsel for the Virginia
State Bar (Oct. 10, 1991).
9. Note, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law-Firm Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 677,
678 (1980); see also M. Peter Moser, Chinese Walls: A Means of Avoiding Law Firm Dis-
qualification When a Personally Disqualified Lawyer Joins the Firm, 3 GEo. J. LEGAL ETH-
ics 399, 400 (1990).
10. Note, supra note 9, at 706.
11. Id. at 705-06.
12. Moser, supra note 9, at 399; see also Note, supra note 9, at 678.
13. Note, supra note 9, at 677 (footnotes omitted); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980) [hereinafter MODEL CODE] ("A Lawyer should Preserve the
Confidences and Secrets of a Client."); MODEL CODE Canon 5 ("A Lawyer Should Exercise
Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client."); MODEL CODE Canon 9 ("A
Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety.").
14. See Moser, supra note 9, at 399; Note, supra note 9, at 677.
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which he had substantial responsibility while a public employee." 15 The
Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility normally requires that an
attorney be personally disqualified from cases that involve potential con-
flicts of interest or disclosure of client confidences.16 In addition, an attor-
ney's entire law firm may be disqualified because of the presumption that
any client confidences possessed by the disqualified attorney will be
shared with other members of the firm.'7
The Chinese wall rebuts the presumption that members of a law firm
will share confidences.' The ABA and many courts have expressed con-
cern that strict application of firm disqualification rules in all circum-
stances will do more harm than good.' Aside from costing a law firm its
clients, the automatic disqualification rules naturally result in delayed tri-
als and a denial of the client's choice of counsel.20 Ethics committees and
commentators have paid particularly close attention to the situation in
which a government attorney moves to a private firm." While there are
strong reasons for both individual and vicarious disqualification in these
15. See MODEL CODE, supra note 13, DR 9-101(B) ("A lawyer shall not accept private
employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public
employee.").
16. See VA. CODE ANN., Rules of Supreme Court of Va., Pt. 6, § II, DR 5-105(D), 9-101(B)
[hereinafter VA. CODE]; Note, supra note 9, at 677. DR 5-105(D) does not require disqualifi-
cation of the attorney if the client whose confidences need to be protected "consents [to the
representation] after disclosure." VA. CODE DR 5-105(D).
17. Note, supra note 9, at 677-78; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Re-
sponsibility, Formal Op. 342 (1975), reprinted in 62 A.B.A. J. 517, 517 n.2 (1976) [hereinaf-
ter Formal Opinion 342] ("The [vicarious disqualification] rule is based on the close, infor-
mal relationship among law partners and associates and upon the incentives, financial and
otherwise, for partners to exchange information freely among themselves when the informa-
tion relates to existing employment."); cf. MODEL CODE, supra note 13, DR 5-105(D) ("If a
lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under a Discipli-
nary Rule, no partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may
accept or continue such employment.").
18. Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 225 (6th Cir. 1988); see
also Note, supra note 9, at 691.
19. In Formal Opinion 342, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibil-
ity endorsed the use of screening devices in situations where an "infected" government at-
torney moves to a private firm -and is disqualified, so that a strict application of MODEL
CODE DR 5-105(D) can be avoided. Formal Opinion 342, supra note 17, at 521. The Com-
mittee stated that "inflexible application of DR 5-105(D) would actually thwart the policy
considerations" underlying the former government attorney disqualification rule, DR 9-
101(B). Id. at 520.
20. Moser, supra note 9, at 404; see Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Cl.
Ct. 1977).
21. See, e.g., Formal Opinion 342, supra note 17; Frances W. Hamermesh, Note, In De-
fense of a Double Standard in the Rules of Ethics: A Critical Reevaluation of the Chinese
Wall and Vicarious Disqualification, 20 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 245, 249 n.17, 260 (1986) (dis-
cussing the Kutak Commission, which was appointed by the ABA to review and revise the
Model Code, and commenting that "[f]rom the outset, the Commission intended to give
special attention to the government attorney").
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situations, 22 there is also a valid fear that an inflexible approach will serve
as a strong disincentive for recent law school graduates to enter the realm
of public service.2
3
Acting on this concern, the ABA adopted Rule 1.11 of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct (Model Rules), which allows a firm to use a Chi-
nese wall to avoid vicarious disqualification in situations where a former
government attorney working for the firm is disqualified from participat-
ing in a case. 24 Several jurisdictions, both prior and subsequent to the
adoption of Rule 1.11, also have acknowledged the Chinese wall defense
in situations where former government attorneys move into the private
sector.25 Essentially, the Chinese wall defense rebuts the presumption
that confidential information about a client will spread from the one "in-
fected" attorney to the rest of the firm.2" If a firm demonstrates that an
effective Chinese wall has been placed around the "infected" attorney, it
overcomes the presumption of shared confidences and thus should not be
automatically disqualified. Of course, the firm will be disqualified if con-
fidences are in fact shared. 28
Unswayed by both the ABA and other jurisdictions, Virginia has not
formally recognized the Chinese wall defense as a method of avoiding vi-
carious disqualification. 9 This Note suggests that Virginia should change
22. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. 914, 923-24 (E.D. Va. 1981) (emphasizing
the concern that confidential information will spread from a disqualified attorney to his
partners and that allowing the disqualified attorney's firm to continue with its representa-
tion will create an "unacceptable appearance of impropriety."); Formal Opinion 342, supra
note 17, at 518 (setting out considerations underlying MODEL CODE DR 9-101(B)).
23. See, e.g., Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1302, supra note 1, at 5-6 ("Since public pol-
icy encourages competent attorneys to enter government service, the unnecessarily harsh
result of vicarious disqualification of an entire firm would only serve to dissuade lawyers
from entering public employment in the first place since employment possibilities following
government service would be severely limited .. "); Formal Opinion 342, supra note 17, at
518 ("[T]he ability of government to recruit young professionals and competent lawyers
should not be interfered with by imposition of harsh restraints upon future practice. . ....
24. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.11.
25. See, e.g., Bauunternehmung v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 793 (1985); Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Kes-
selhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Kovacevic v. Fair Automotive Repair,
Inc., 641 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
26. See, e.g., Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 225 (6th Cir.
1988); Hamermesh, supra note 21, at 256.
27. See, e.g., Manning, 849 F.2d at 225; Note, supra note 9, at 691.
28. See Moser, supra note 9, at 411; Note, supra note 9, at 691.
29. As discussed at the beginning of this Note, the Virginia State Bar Standing Commit-
tee on Legal Ethics has supported the use of the Chinese wall defense in those limited
situations where a former government attorney moves to a private firm and is disqualified
from participating in a civil matter only under DR 9-101(B). See Virginia Legal Ethics
Opinion 1302, supra note 1, at 4. However, the Supreme Court of Virginia disapproved the
opinion and it was subsequently withdrawn. Telephone Interview with Susan B. Spielberg,
Assistant Bar Counsel for the Virginia State Bar (Oct. 10, 1991).
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its position and acknowledge the defense when former government attor-
neys move to private practice.30 A Chinese wall, when properly used, acts
as an effective screening mechanism that protects former client confi-
dences and the integrity of the judicial system, and a Chinese wall still
allows the firm to continue representing its present client. This Note be-
gins with a brief overview of the rationale behind individual and vicarious
disqualification; the concerns that have arisen with regard to vicarious
disqualification in the context of government attorneys moving into pri-
vate firms; and the subsequent development of the Chinese wall defense.
Then, the Note examines the use of the defense in several jurisdictions
outside of Virginia. Finally, the Note recommends a plan for using the
Chinese wall defense in Virginia.
II. INDIVIDUAL AND VICARIOUS DISQUALIFICATION 31
Disqualification due to a potential or established conflict of interest can
affect both the individual attorney and his firm. If a single attorney is
individually disqualified from the representation, the entire firm may be
vicariously disqualified as well.
A. Individual Disqualification
When an attorney leaves government employment to join a private
firm, it is possible that the firm will at some point represent a client in a
matter in which that client has interests adverse to those of the attorney's
former government clients.32 In this situation an ethical concern arises
30. A discussion of the use of Chinese walls in situations where an attorney transfers
between two firms is beyond the scope of this Note. Apparently, some jurisdictions support
a less rigid application of vicarious disqualification rules in the context of the government
attorney than in a private transfer situation. Nevertheless, other courts and some commen-
tators assert that the Chinese wall defense should apply equally in these circumstances. See,
e.g., Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 226 (6th Cir. 1988) (The
court "see[s] no reason why the considerations which led the American Bar Association to
approve appropriate screening for former government attorneys, should not apply in the
case of private attorneys who change their association."); Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417
(7th Cir. 1983); Moser, supra note 9, at 400.
31. A full discussion of the principles underlying disqualification of an attorney, and the
resulting vicarious disqualification of his or her firm, based on a client conflict of interest,
exceeds the scope of this Note. However, a brief overview will provide a basis for looking at
the usefulness and limitations of the Chinese wall as a defense to vicarious disqualification.
Because this Note focuses on instances in which a government attorney enters private prac-
tice, the discussion of disqualification will be based on this perspective. Disqualification due
to a potential or established conflict of interest can affect both the individual attorney and
his firm. If a single attorney is individually disqualified from the representation, the entire
firm may be vicariously disqualified as well.
32. There is some debate regarding whether a government agency qualifies as a "client."
One commentator states that the attorney-client relationship is "an element lacking in the
government context." Note, supra note 9, at 681 n.18. However, some courts refer to govern-
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because the former government lawyer could violate the provisions of
Model Code of Professional Responsibility ("Model Code") Canon 4,33
which requires that "a lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets
of a client. 3 4 Regardless of whether the attorney actually gained or re-
members "confidences and secrets" of his former client,35 and regardless
of whether he will "knowingly" reveal this information,"6 the attorney is
normally disqualified as a "prophylactic" measure. 7 This measure "'frees
lawyers from the difficult task of erecting Chinese walls in their own
minds between what is confidential and what is not, and forwards the
public's interest in maintaining the highest standards of professional con-
duct and the scrupulous administration of justice.' ",38
The former government attorney situation may also undermine the
provisions of Model Code Canon 5: "A Lawyer Should Exercise Indepen-
dent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client."3 9 This mandate ap-
plies primarily to instances where an attorney attempts to represent two
ment agencies as "client" agencies. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. 914 (E.D.
Va. 1981). In Virginia, a government agency is treated as a client for purposes of individual
and vicarious disqualification under VIRGINIA CODE DR 5-105. Telephone Interview with Su-
san B. Spielberg, Assistant Bar Counsel for the Virginia State Bar (Oct. 10, 1991). Of course,
the provisions of VIRGINIA CODE DR 9-101(B) do not require an attorney-client relationship.
33. Canons 4, 5 and 9 of the MODEL CODE are identical to those in the VIRGINIA CODE.
34. MODEL CODE, supra note 13, Canon 4; see VA.CODE, supra note 16, DR 4-101(B), pro-
viding that:
(B) Except as provided by DR 4-101(C) and (D), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or a third
person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
See also Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1302, supra note 1, at 2 ("Ethical Consideration 4-6
... indicates that the obligation of a lawyer to preserve the confidence and secrets of his
client continues after the termination of his employment); Note, supra note 9, at 681 ("In
the successive representation context, the chief ethical concern, addressed in Canon 4, is
that confidential information relating to the former client will be disclosed or used to his
disadvantage.").
35. See In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. at 920 ("The law presumes that an attorney
possesses all confidential information to which he had access in his prior representation of a
client. . . ").
36. Both the MODEL CODE, supra note 13, DR 4-101(B) and the VA. CODE, supra note 16,
DR 4-101(B) require an attorney to not "knowingly" reveal or use a confidence. See Formal
Opinion 342, supra note 17, at 517.
37. In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. at 921 ("These considerations require application
of a strict prophylactic rule to prevent any possibility, however slight, that confidential in-
formation acquired from a client during a previous relationship may subsequently be used
to the client's disadvantage.").
38. Id. at 920 (quoting Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 569 (2d Cir. 1975)).
39. MODEL CODE, supra note 13, Canon 5.
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or more clients with conflicting interests concurrently.40 This circum-
stance obviously calls into question the ability of the attorney to "serve
his or her client with undivided loyalty."'4 1 However, Canon 5 also may
require disqualification of an attorney in subsequent representation cases
when the attorney switches sides in a dispute.42 Virginia Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility DR 5-105(D) clearly states that "[a] lawyer who has
represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another
person in the same or substantially related matter if the interest of that
person is adverse in any material respect to the interest of the former
client unless the former client consents after disclosure. 43 While DR 5-
105(D) is listed under Canon 5, it also serves to protect against the im-
proper use of client confidences.
Finally, in DR 9-101(B), the Model Code specifically addresses the gov-
ernment lawyer who moves into private practice: "A lawyer shall not ac-
cept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial respon-
sibility while he was a public employee."'4" The ABA Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility states that the numerous considerations
underlying DR 9-101(B) include:
the treachery of switching sides; the safeguarding of confidential govern-
mental information from future use against the government; the need to
discourage government lawyers from handling particular assignments in
such a way as to encourage their own future employment in regard to those
particular matters after leaving government service; and the professional
benefit derived from avoiding the appearance of evil.
45
40. Note, supra note 9, at 681; Formal Opinion 342, supra note 17, at 51718; see Arm-
strong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 445 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S.
1106 (1981).
41. Note, supra note 9, at 681.
42. Formal Opinion 342, supra note 17, at 518 ("The rules also forbid a lawyer to switch
sides even in situations where the exercise of the lawyer's professional judgment on behalf of
a present client will not be affected.") (footnote omitted).
43. VA. CODE, supra note 16, DR 5-105(D). The "consent" provision can be an important
one, for "consent granted by the former government client, after full disclosure of the possi-
ble effect and conditions of such representation, [will] cure any impropriety." Virginia Legal
Ethics Opinion 1302, supra note 1, at 3. In these circumstances, neither the individual attor-
ney, nor his firm, would be disqualified. Id.
44. MODEL CODE, supra note 13, DR 9-101(B); VA. CODE, supra note 16, DR 9-101(B). For
a full explanation of the terms embodied in DR 9-101(B), see Formal Opinion 342, supra
note 17, at 519-20. The Virginia State Bar's Standing Committee on Legal Ethics interprets
the disciplinary rule in Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1302, supra note 1, at 2-3.
45. Formal Opinion 342, supra note 17, at 518 (footnotes omitted).
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B. Vicarious Disqualification
Generally, when one attorney is disqualified from representing a client,
all attorneys affiliated with that attorney are also disqualified.4" In 1974,
the ABA codified this generalization by amending its disciplinary rules to
require vicarious disqualification of any "partner, or associate, or any
other lawyer affiliated with [the disqualified lawyer] or his firm" in cases
where the individual attorney is prohibited from representing a client
"under a Disciplinary Rule."4 7 Interestingly, Virginia Code DR 5-105(E)
is not this broad, only requiring vicarious disqualification where the indi-
vidual attorney is disqualified specifically under the provisions of DR 5-
105.48 Yet, the general vicarious disqualification standard applies even
when DR 5-105 is not implicated.
41
The basis for vicarious disqualification is straightforward. First, there is
a presumption that the "tainted" attorney will share client confidences
with the other attorneys in the firm 5 due to "'the close, informal rela-
tionship among law partners and associates and. . . the incentives, finan-
cial and otherwise, for partners to exchange information freely among
themselves when the information relates to existing employment.' "51
Thus, vicarious disqualification based on this presumption is another pro-
phylactic measure designed to protect client confidences.
5 2
In addition, vicarious disqualification assists in preventing "even the
appearance of professional impropriety.""3 Understandably, the public
will be skeptical when an attorney switches sides, or is in a position to use
his former client's confidences improperly, yet his firm continues to re-
present its client.5 4 Several courts and commentators argue that disquali-
fying the entire firm in these circumstances avoids this appearance of im-
46. Id. at 517 n.2; Note, supra note 9, at 682.
47. MODEL CODE, supra note 13, DR 5-105(D). Prior to 1974, DR 5-105(D) required vica-
rious disqualification only when the individual attorney was disqualified under DR 5-105.
Formal Opinion 342, supra note 17, at 517 n.1.
48. VA. CODE. supra note 16, DR 5-105(E) ("If a lawyer is required to decline employment
or to withdraw from employment under DR 5-105, no partner or associate of his.or his firm
may accept or continue such employment.").
49. See Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1302, supra note 1, at 4 (supporting the use of a
Chinese wall so that the firm can avoid vicarious disqualification in cases where the attorney
is disqualified only under DR 9-101(B)).
50. Note, supra note 9, at 682; Moser, supra note 9, at 399 n.1.
51. In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. 914, 922 (E.D. Va. 1981) (quoting Formal Opinion
342, supra note 17, at 517 n.2).
52. Id. at 922 ("[It is the possibility of the breach of confidence, not the fact of the
breach that triggers disqualification.").
53. MODEL CODE, supra note 13, Canon 9.
54. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 453-54 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J., dissent-
ing), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. at
924.
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propriety and prevents compromising the integrity of the judicial
system.
55
C. Concerns with Vicarious Disqualification
Strong ethical and policy considerations, notably protecting client con-
fidences5' and avoiding the appearance of impropriety, 7 underlie vicari-
ous disqualification. Yet, the ABA has acknowledged that there are also
"weighty policy considerations" which suggest that the vicarious disquali-
fication rules should be applied more flexibly, particularly with respect to
former government attorneys.5 8 Justifiably, an attorney who desires to
leave public service and join a private law firm may be concerned that
strict application of vicarious disqualification rules will give her the "sta-
tus of a Typhoid Mary."' 9 Firms may be wary of hiring government law-
yers due to the possibility of losing potential or present clients, and the
employment opportunities of former government attorneys consequently
may be limited. 0
Realizing this dilemma, recent graduates may decide against entering
government service, thereby increasing the difficulty of recruiting compe-
tent professionals for government service.6 1 Those who are willing to
enter public service should not be required to make "too great a
sacrifice.
6 2
Other policy considerations favor exceptions to the vicarious disqualifi-
cation rules in instances involving government attorneys moving to pri-
vate practice. While the privacy of the attorney-client relationship is
"sacrosanct" and the confidences of the former client must be protected,
the "prerogative of a [current] party to proceed with counsel of its
55. See Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 453-54; In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. at 924; Note,
supra note 9, at 685-86.
56. See MODEL CODE, supra note 13, Canon 4.
57. See id. Canon 9.
58. Formal Opinion 342, supra note 17, at 518; see Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d
791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977) ("We share the view expressed in ... Formal Opinion 342 that an
inexorable disqualification of an entire firm for the disqualification of a single member or
associate, is entirely too harsh and should be mitigated by appropriate screening....
59. Kesselhaut, 555 F.2d at 793.
60. See id. (former government attorney may "be reduced to sole practice under the most
unfavorable conditions"); Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d at 443 (former government attor-
neys may be "shunned by prospective private employers because hiring them may result in
the disqualification of an entire firm in a possibly wide range of cases"); Moser, supra note
9, at 403; Formal Opinion 342, supra note 17, at 518.
61. See, e.g., Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 443 ("[D]isapproval [of screening procedures] may
hamper the government's efforts to hire qualified attorneys ... ."); Formal Opinion 342,
supra note 17, at 518 ("[T]he ability of government to recruit young professionals and com-
petent lawyers should not be interfered with by imposition of harsh restraints upon future
practice .. ").
62. Formal Opinion 342, supra note 17, at 518.
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choice" is also an important consideration. 3 This concept goes far beyond
merely giving the client freedom of choice. The client could additionally
suffer dire consequences if substitute counsel must be obtained, particu-
larly in cases where the litigation is advanced or the firm has been repre-
senting the client for a lengthy period of time.6 ' As one court noted, sepa-
rating a client from his counsel could "perhaps altogether thwart" that
client's case. 5 Thus, strict application of vicarious disqualification rules
may result in disqualification motions becoming "mere tool[s] enabling a
litigant to improve his [own] prospects by depriving his opponent of com-
petent counsel."6 6
Finally, vicarious disqualification hurts the firm itself, by costing the
firm clients and by making the hiring of lateral attorneys difficult.6 7 More
importantly, inflexible application of the rules may scar the entire legal
profession by displaying a lack of trust in the ability of an attorney to
protect confidences and carry on his practice with integrity. 6 These con-
cerns prompted one court to state that vicarious disqualification "is a
'drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when ab-
solutely necessary.'-9
III. BUILDING THE CHINESE WALL - ONE BRICK AT A TIME
A. Development of the Defense
After the 1974 amendment to Model Code DR 5-105(D), requiring vica-
rious disqualification of the entire firm if an attorney was disqualified
under any disciplinary rule, some jurisdictions began finding ways to
avoid vicarious disqualification, particularly where former government at-
torneys were involved. One of the key presumptions of the disqualifica-
tion process is that the attorney, either intentionally or inadvertently, will
63. Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983); see Formal Opinion 342,
supra note 17, at 518-19.
64. See Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1275 (7th Cir. 1983) (Coffey,
J., dissenting) (quoting Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co., 689 F.2d 715, 720 (7th
Cir. 1982)) ("'[I]t may also be difficult, if not impossible for [a substitute] attorney to
master "the nuances of the legal and factual matters" late in the litigation of a complex
case.' ").
65. Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 445.
66. Formal Opinion 342, supra note 17, at 518.
67. Moser, supra note 9, at 404.
68. See Analytica, Inc., 708 F.2d at 1275 (Coffey, J., dissenting) ("After all, an attorney's
and/or a law firm's most valuable asset is their professional reputation for competence, and
above all honesty and integrity, which should not be jeopardized in a summary type of dis-
qualification proceeding of this nature."); Moser, supra note 9, at 404 ("[D]isqualification
motions damage the legal profession in general by challenging the integrity of lawyers.").
69. Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Bauunternehmung v.
United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 793, 794 (1985) ("[D]isqualification of the firm is appropriate only
where on the particular facts the conflict of interest evil cannot otherwise be mitigated.").
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divulge confidential information to those around him. Some courts merely
refuse to presume this sharing of knowledge, thereby avoiding the vicari-
ous disqualification question altogether.1 0 Other courts view the presump-
tion as rebuttable,7 1 allowing a firm to defeat a motion to disqualify by
showing that a screening mechanism, such as a Chinese wall, has been put
into place to "insulate against any flow of confidential information from
the 'infected' attorney to any other member of his present firm. ' 72 For
example, in a leading case on the propriety of Chinese walls, the United
States Claims Court allowed a firm to continue representing its client be-
cause the disqualified attorney was effectively screened from the matter.
73
In contrast, other jurisdictions refuse to acknowledge the effectiveness
of a Chinese wall, holding the imputation of knowledge from the attorney
to his firm to be an irrebuttable presumption.7 4 These jurisdictions es-
pouse several arguments for rejecting walls: the difficulty in determining
their effectiveness; the possibility of inadvertent disclosures; the fact that
proving a breach of confidence may lead to disclosure of the confidence
itself; and the possibility that economic incentives may cause the attorney
to disclose confidences. 7 5 There also is a concern that even an effective
Chinese wall does not eliminate the appearance of impropriety which may
exist when a government attorney "switches sides" and his firm is able to
continue the representation.
7 1
B. Using the Chinese Wall to Block Vicarious Disqualification
The use of the Chinese wall as an effective device for protecting client
confidences, while enabling a firm to avoid disqualification, is now wide-
spread. The ABA and many jurisdictions have acknowledged the propri-
ety of the Chinese wall defense in cases in which former government at-
torneys are individually disqualified.
70. See Hamermesh, supra note 21, at 264 ("[C]ourts have differed in their willingness to
impute ... shared confidence[s] to the firm .... ).
71. See, e.g., Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 225 (6th Cir.
1988); Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 421; Hamnermesh, supra note 21, ,at 264.
72. Schiessle, 717 F.2d at 421.
73. Bauunternehmung v. United States, 8 C1. Ct. 793 (1985).
74. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. 914, 922 (E.D. Va. 1981)
("[D]isqualification is required without showing that an attorney possessed explicit confi-
dences which were ... transmitted to ... other members of the law firm . ... and is re-
quired whether or not the other members of the firm are actually exposed to the informa-
tion."); Hamermesh, supra note 21, at 264.
75. Moser, supra note 9, at 403.
76. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 453-54 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J.,
dissenting), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Note, supra note 9, at 685.
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1. The Kutak Commission and Model Rule 1.11
In 1975, the ABA's Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibil-
ity released Formal Opinion 342, 7 which supports the use of screening
measures in cases where former government lawyers are disqualified.
Soon after, the ABA formed the Kutak Commission to review and, if nec-
essary, revise the Model Code.78 While the Kutak Commission "assumed
the task of reformulating the [entire Model] Code, ' 79 the issue of vicari-
ous disqualification in the context of the former government attorney re-
ceived "special attention."80
In 1983, after lengthy deliberation over the ethical and public policy
considerations involved with client conflicts of interest and individual and
vicarious disqualification, 81 the ABA formally adopted Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 1.11. The 1989 version of Rule 1.11 (Succes-
sive Government and Private Employment) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, a lawyer shall not re-
present a private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer
participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee,
unless the appropriate government agency consents after consultation. No
lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly under-
take or continue representation in such a matter unless:
(1) the disqualified lawyer is screened from any participation in the
matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and
(2) written notice is promptly given to the appropriate government
agency to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this
rule.2
In Rule 1.11, the ABA expressly supports the use of screening devices,
recognizing that the attorney "infected" with confidential government in-
formation can be effectively excluded from participation in the represen-
tation of the matter.
77. Formal Opinion 342, supra note 17.
78. Hamermesh, supra note 21, at 252 n.39. The ABA's Committee on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility issued Formal Opinion 342 in 1975. See supra note 17. The Kutak
Commission was created in 1977.
79. Hamermesh, supra note 21, at 252 n.39.
80. Id. at 260 ("From the outset, the Commission intended to give special attention to the
government attorney.").
81. "The ABA House of Delegates adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct on
August 2, 1983, after '[s]ix years of debate and often heated controversy' that 'ended on a
comparatively harmonious note.'" Id. at 252 n.39 (citing 52 U.S.L.W. 2077 (Aug. 9, 1983)).
82. MODEL RULES, supra note 3, Rule 1.11.
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2. Kesselhaut v. United States
Many courts have agreed with the ABA, and their decisions provide
guidance to law firms regarding the type of wall the firms should imple-
ment to avoid vicarious disqualification. One of the first decisions recog-
nizing the Chinese wall defense was Kesselhaut v. United States.8 3 In
Kesselhaut, Prothro, who had been general counsel of the Federal Hous-
ing Administration (FHA), retired from government service and joined
the firm of Krooth and Altman. Kesselhaut was a private practitioner
who had represented the FHA in several tax abatement cases on fore-
closed property. In this context, Kesselhaut had been in sporadic contact
with Prothro. However, most of his contacts were with Prothro's
subordinates.
8 4
After Prothro joined Krooth and Altman, a dispute arose between Kes-
selhaut and the FHA regarding the fees owed to Kesselhaut. Kesselhaut
contacted Prothro, hoping that Krooth and Altman could represent him
in his action against the FHA.85 Prothro stated that he could not person-
ally participate, but Krooth and Altman could handle the case for Kes-
selhaut8s Prothro did not discuss the merits of the claim with Kesselhaut
or with the other attorneys at Krooth and Altman, and a "Chinese wall"
was built so Prothro would have no connection with the case. The attor-
neys at Krooth and Altman were warned, not to discuss the case with
Prothro, and the files were kept locked.'
Despite these precautions, the trial court disqualified Krooth and Alt-
man. 8s On appeal, the United States Court of Claims 9 reversed. Con-
cerned that an attorney who leaves the government to join a private firm
would become a "Typhoid Mary"90 if the transfer of confidences to the
attorney's associates was always presumed, the court stated that "disqual-
ification of an entire firm for the disqualification of a single member...,
is entirely too harsh and should be mitigated by appropriate screen-
ing. .. ."91 Emphasizing that Prothro earned a straight salary and did
not participate in the firm's earnings and acknowledging other precau-
83. 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
84. Id. at 792-93.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 793.
88. Id. at 792.
89. The United States Court of Claims is now designated the United States Claims Court.
90. Id. at 793.
91. Id.; see also Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 420 (7th Cir. 1983)
("[D]isqualification is a 'drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except
when absolutely necessary.' "); Bauunternehmung v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 793, 794 (1985)
("Disqualification of an entire firm as a result of disqualification of a single member or
associate is an exceedingly harsh remedy.").
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tions taken by Krooth and Altman, the court found the screening of
Prothro was "appropriate."92 While recognizing the effectiveness of
screening in this instance, the court noted that each case requires an indi-
vidual evaluation; in some cases "no screening procedure will be
adequate. ' ' 3
3. Bauunternehmung v. United States
Following Kesselhaut, the United States Claims Court advanced the
development of Chinese walls in Bauunternehmung v. United States.9
The firm of O'Haire, Fiore and von Maur had represented the plaintiff in
its case against the government for thirteen years.95 Matthews, who had
been counsel of record in the case while employed by the Department of
Justice, joined O'Haire, Fiore, and von Maur during the pendency of the
action. The United States sought to have the firm disqualified.9" Follow-
ing the rationale of Kesselhaut, the court looked closely at the screening
provisions adopted by O'Haire, Fiore, and von Maur to determine if dis-
qualification was proper.97
Stating that screening must be "explicit and inflexible,"' 8 the Bauun-
ternehmung court identified steps the firm had to take to avoid disquali-
fication. First, Matthews could not receive any fees associated with the
litigation. Second, he could not communicate with the plaintiff or its rep-
resentatives. Also, he could not prepare anything or discuss matters with
any of his associates with respect to the case. He was denied access to all
case files, and finally, his associates were to be advised of all of these
precautions.9 Satisfied that the firm met these provisions, the court al-
lowed O'Haire, Fiore and von Maur to continue its representation.
The Bauunternehmung decision provides guidance as to what elements
are required for an effective Chinese wall. Further, it demonstrates the
court's strong faith in the concept of the wall itself. Despite the presence
in the case of factors that normally work to defeat the effectiveness of a
screening mechanism, the court upheld the Chinese wall defense. First,
O'Haire, Fiore and von Maur consisted of only four members.1 0" Walls are
much harder to erect effectively in small firms than in larger firms, where
92. Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. C1. 1977).
93. Id.
94. 8 C1. Ct. 793 (1985).
95. Id. at 794.
96. Id. at 793.
97. Id. at 794 ("Disqualification of the firm may be avoided by use of appropriate and
effective screening procedures.").
98. Id.
99. Id. at 795.
100. Id. at 793.
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there may be physical and organizational separation. 10 1 Additionally, the
"infected" attorney in Bauunternehmung had been heavily'involved with
the case while with the government. 102 As a result, there was little doubt
that he actually had been privy to confidential information. However, the
Bauunternehmung court allowed the Chinese wall defense to stand, find-
ing that the firm's screening mechanisms would effectively prevent the
inadvertent flow of confidential information.
4. Armstrong v. McAlpin
Other jurisdictions have supported the use of Chinese walls to avoid
vicarious disqualification in situations where a former government attor-
ney is involved.'0 3 For example, in Armstrong v. McAlpin'0 the Second
Circuit examined vicarious disqualification and the validity of screening
devices. Although the Armstrong judgment was later vacated on other
grounds by the United States Supreme Court,'0 5 the Second Circuit's
analysis and approval of the Chinese wall mechanism have influenced de-
cisions in other jurisdictions.
The Armstrong case involved a securities fraud suit in which Arm-
strong was appointed as receiver for a group of investment companies and
had the primary responsibility of recovering money that had been misap-
propriated by McAlpin and others.'0 6 Armstrong retained his own law
firm to carry out the litigation, and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) gave its investigatory files to that firm.' 07 However, after it
had invested a vast amount of time in preparation of the case, the firm
101. See Moser, supra note 9, at 410 ("Screening is not likely to be effective, for example,
in a small firm of lawyers, all of whom are located on one floor and share secretarial and
litigation support personnel.").
102. Bauunternehmung v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 793, 793 (1985). Matthews had been in
close contact with the client agency, discussing settlement possibilities and reviewing the
agency's view of the case. Cf. Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (rec-
ognizing the Chinese wall defense where former government attorney had "sporadic" expo-
sure to the sensitive matter).
103. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other
grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); Kovacevic v. Fair Automotive Repair, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 237
(N.D. Ill. 1986); "Revolving Door" Case, 445 A.2d 615 (D.C. 1982).
104. 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
105. 449 U.S. 1106 (1981). In Armstrong, the trial court denied the defendants' motion to
disqualify plaintiff's law firm and the defense filed an interlocutory appeal. 625 F.2d at 437.
A panel of the Second Circuit heard the appeal and reversed the trial court's decision. Id.
However, an en banc proceeding was ordered and the court reconsidered the appeal, finding
that the denial of a disqualification motion is not appealable until after entry of a final
judgment. Id. at 437, 440. Instead of then dismissing the appeal, the court proceeded to
reach the merits of the disqualification issue. Id. at 441-46. The United States Supreme
Court vacated the judgment on the merits because the appeal itself was not proper. See
generally, 449 U.S. 1106.
106. 625 F.2d at 434-35.
107. Id. at 435.
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discovered a conflict of interest with one of its other clients. 08 Conse-
quently, Armstrong had to find another firm capable of handling the liti-
gation. He retained the Gordon Hurwitz firm, 109 not realizing that Alt-
man, a former SEC attorney had recently joined the Gordon firm."0
Altman had been involved with the investigation of the same investment
companies while he was with the SEC.-' This situation created a conflict
of interest for Altman. The court determined that although Altman could
not personally participate in the representation, 12 the Gordon firm still
could do so.113
Almost two years later, the defendants filed a motion to disqualify
Gordon Hurwitz.' 14 The trial judge denied the motion.'1 5 The Second Cir-
cuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the trial court's decision to allow Gordon
Hurwitz to continue the representation. 11  The appellate court's funda-
mental concern was maintaining the integrity of the trial process.11" The
court determined that there was no fear that the Gordon firm would lack
"vigor" in its representation,' nor could the firm use confidential infor-
mation gained through prior representation of the defendant.1' 9 Addition-
ally, because Altman was screened from participation and the SEC had
already given Armstrong its files, the firm could not use "secret" SEC
information.120 As a result, the "Gordon firm's representation of the re-
ceiver posed no threat to the integrity of the trial process."12
The Armstrong opinion supports the Chinese wall concept in two im-
portant ways. First, the court downplayed the need to invoke vicarious
disqualification simply because a "possible appearance of impropriety"
108. Id. One of the firm's clients was a possible defendant in the litigation brought by
Armstrong.
109. Id. at 435-36.
110. Id. at 436.
111. Id.
112. "Altman was concededly disqualified from participating in the litigation under
[Model Code] Disciplinary Rule 9-101(B) .... " Id. at 442.
113. Id. at 436. Both Armstrong's firm and the Gordon firm concluded that Altman's dis-
qualification should not disqualify Gordon Hurwitz. In addition, the trial judge was advised
of the situation and he approved of the use of the Gordon firm.
114. Id. at 436-37.
115. Id. at 437.
116. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
117. 625 F.2d at 444.
118. Id. at 445. This concern arises primarily where a firm is representing clients with
"conflicting interests at the same time." Id. (emphasis added). See MODEL CODE, supra note
13, Canon 5 ("A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a
Client."); Note, supra note 9, at 681 (discussing ethical concerns in concurrent representa-
tion cases).
119. 625 F.2d at 445. The Gordon firm had never represented McAlpin and the other
defendants.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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might exist.122 Finding that separating a client from his counsel, particu-
larly after much preparation has been done, could substantially delay or
even thwart litigation, the court stated that the "'appearance of impro-
priety is simply too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification or-
der.' 1123 The Armstrong court used a balancing test, reflecting a concern
for ethical considerations, tempered by practical application of real-world
needs. Second, the court indicated that its "restrained" approach to dis-
qualification would reinforce public confidence in the efficiency and fair-
ness of the judicial process.124 Screening devices such as Chinese walls
compose part of this "restrained" approach.
IV. THE REQUISITE BRICKS IN THE CHINESE WALL
A Chinese wall is "implemented to effectively insulate against any flow
of confidential information from the 'infected' attorney to any other
member of his present firm.' 25 Essentially, the disqualified attorney
should be completely screened from participating in any matter in which
he has a conflict, not only in terms of communications and strategies, but
also with respect to financial rewards.""
A law firm must include several key elements in its wall to prohibit the
flow of client confidences and to persuade the court to recognize it as a
valid defense to vicarious disqualification. First, the wall must be erected
as soon as the conflict of interest is discovered.127 If it is not, the chance
of an inadvertent disclosure of information is greatly increased and the
122. Id. See MODEL CODE, supra note 13, Canon 9 ("A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the
Appearance of Professional Impropriety."). The court in Armstrong recognized that it
should adopt a more restrained approach to disqualification where the only real concern is
how the public will view the situation. One commentator, looking at former government
cases in general, provides a good analysis of the two standards that are applied:
[T]he firm-disqualification rule. . . [serves] a dual purpose: to prevent instances of
actual impropriety and also to avoid the appearance of impropriety. Only the first of
these may fairly be characterized as ethical; the second is more a matter of public
policy. When no risk of actual impropriety is present, and disqualification of the firm
would function solely to avoid improper appearances, it makes sense to take into ac-
count other countervailing public policies.
Note, supra note 9, at 702 (footnotes omitted).
123. 625 F.2d at 445 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir.
1979)); accord Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1302, supra note 1, at 6.
124. Id. at 446.
125. Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1983).
126. See, e.g., Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (the screened
attorney should have no "connection" with the case); Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1302,
supra note 1, at 4 (the firm must establish "measures which effectively isolate the individual
lawyer.").
127. Moser, supra note 9, at 410; Craig A. Peterson, Rebuttable Presumptions and Intra-
firm Screening: The New Seventh Circuit Approach to Vicarious Disqualification of Liti-
gation Counsel, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 399, 410 (1984); Note, supra note 9, at 713; Virginia
Legal Ethics Opinion 1302, supra note 1, at 4-5.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
propriety of the wall defense is doubtful.128 Second, the screened lawyer
must not be allowed to discuss the sensitive matter with those in his new
firm.129 Third, the screened lawyer must be strictly denied access to the
documents and files related to representation.1 30 Fourth, if possible, the
screened attorney should be physically separated from those working on
the sensitive matter and should use different support personnel. 13 1 Any
organizational or departmental separation is helpful as well. 13 2 All of
these steps aid in preventing the disqualified attorney from coming into
contact with, or inadvertently leaking information about, the sensitive
matter.
Additionally, the screened lawyer should not receive any portion of the
fees created by the representation.1 33 Obviously, the temptation to breach
the wall is enhanced if there is a financial incentive to do so." 4 Moreover,
all members of the firm should be notified of the existence of the wall,
and sanctions for breaching the wall should be established." 5 Finally, the
former client (government agency) or its counsel should be notified, so
that it can monitor the effectiveness of the wall."36 This safeguard is im-
portant because the existence of the Chinese wall simply rebuts the pre-
sumption that confidences will be shared - if an actual breach occurs,
the firm should be disqualified." 7
Even if all of these precautions are strictly followed, courts are still
justified in refusing to recognize the screening mechanism as an effective
defense in some cases. The determination of whether the Chinese wall
128. See Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983) ("[A]
firm must demonstrate that an effective 'Chinese Wall'. . . was established early enough to
prevent even an inadvertent intra-firm disclosure of a former client's confidences."); In re
Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. 914, 923 (E.D. Va. 1981) ("Because of the lapse of time...
there exists the real possibility that improper communication did in fact pass between [the
attorney] and his firm.").
129. See, e.g., Moser, supra note 9, at 410; Note, supra note 9, at 713; Virginia Legal
Ethics Opinion 1302, supra note 1, at 5.
130. See, e.g., Bauunternehmnung v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 793, 795 (1985); Moser, supra
note 9, at 410-11; Note, supra note 9, at 713; Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1302, supra note
1, at 4.
131. See Moser, supra note 9, at 410; Note, supra note 9, at 713.
132. E.g., Moser, supra note 9, at 410; Note, supra note 9, at 713.
133. E.g., Bauunternehmung v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 793, 795 (1985); Moser, supra
note 9, at 410; Note, supra note 9, at 713; Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1302, supra note 1,
at 5.
134. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. 914, 923 (E.D. Va. 1981) ("[T]here is the
,continuing risk that the agreement not to talk ... will not be effective given the ... finan-
cial incentives which exist to discuss current employment."); Formal Opinion 342, supra
note 17, at 517 n.2.
135. Moser, supra note 9, at 411; Note, supra note 9, at 713.
136. Moser, supra note 9, at 410; Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1302, supra note 1, at 5.
137. Note, supra note 9, at 691 ("Evidence that disclosure has in fact taken place serves,
in effect, to nullify the Chinese wall defense.").
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defense rebuts the presumption that confidences are shared among asso-
ciates must be made on a "case-by-case basis. '1 38 Courts must consider
the size of the firm and the number of "tainted" lawyers.1 3 9 Obviously, if
the firm is small or if the number of screened attorneys within the firm is
great, it is more likely that confidences will be accidentally leaked. The
court will also consider the "magnitude of the litigation" and the financial
incentives it offers the firm, for these may provide temptations to breach
the wall."01 In this respect, it is important to remember that any screening
device is only going to prevent "inadvertent or unconscious transfers of
information" - if "two people are determined to share information," a
Chinese wall is useless.141 As these considerations indicate, "[tihere will
be instances where no screening procedure will be adequate.' 4 2
As mentioned earlier, some courts and commentators have expressed
the concern that, even if a Chinese wall effectively prevents a transfer of
client confidences, it will not extinguish the appearance of impropriety
that might exist in the eyes of the public. 14 Assuming that the public is
aware of the "details of a law firm's efforts to avoid disqualification,"'
44 it
is "very likely" that the public will "conclude that a voluntary screening
process. . . [will] be breached.' 1 45 One court argues that allowing the use
of Chinese walls in these circumstances will "compromise the public's
perception of the integrity of [courts] and shake the public's confidence
in the administration of justice." 146
Nevertheless, simply avoiding a possible "appearance of impropriety" is
a weak rationale for creating the hardship that can result if a firm is dis-
qualified."47 Certainly, it is important for the public to have a positive
view of the judicial process, but "the rules of law, including the rules of
disqualification, cannot cater to all the often-unfounded apprehensions of
138. Schiessle v. Stephens, 717 F.2d 417, 421 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Kesselhaut v.
United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977) ("Each case depends on its own merits.").
139. See Moser, supra note 9, at 410; Note, supra note 9, at 712.
140. In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. 914, 923 (E.D. Va. 1981).
141. Donald R. McMinn, ABA Formal Opinion 88-356: New Justification for Increased
Use of Screening Devices to Avert Attorney Disqualification, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1255-
56 (1990).
142. Kesselhaut, 555 F.2d at 793.
143. See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 453-54 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J.,
dissenting), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981); In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F.
Supp. at 924; Note, supra note 9, at 685-86.
144. Note, supra note 9, at 685 ("No matter how effective, Chinese walls are not likely to
foster public confidence because the details of a law firm's efforts to avoid disqualification
will doubtless make but a small impression upon public awareness.").
145. In re Asbestos Cases, 514 F. Supp. at 924.
146. Id.
147. See Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 445; Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1302, supra note 1, at
5-6.
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the public."14 Regardless of whether the public understands the Chinese
wall concept,14 9 "[a]ppearance must be measured by reality, which should
include the particular internal screen or 'Chinese Wall' and its apparent
effectiveness in avoiding improper conduct."' 150 Where there is "no threat
to the integrity of the trial process," a "possible 'appearance of impropri-
ety is simply too slender a reed on which to rest a disqualification
order.' ,151
V. USE OF CHINESE WALLS IN VIRGINIA
In 1989, the Standing Committee on Legal Ethics of the Virginia State
Bar supported the use of Chinese walls in those limited situations where a
former government attorney is disqualified from a civil matter only under
9-101(B).' 52 The Committee noted that the Virginia Code does not ex-
pressly require vicarious disqualification in these circumstances.' 53 It fur-
ther indicated that strict application of disqualification rules "would not
be in the best interests of the public or of the profession."' 54 However,
the Supreme Court of Virginia disapproved Legal Ethics Opinion 1302,
and it was withdrawn. 155 Virginia courts should acknowledge the effec-
tiveness of Chinese walls in preventing the sharing of client confidences
in successive representation situations where an attorney has moved from
the government to a firm and may have privileged information about a
client. As such, the Chinese wall defense should give firms a means of
rebutting the presumption of shared confidences'5" and enable them to
avoid vicarious disqualification if they can show that an effective wall has
been built and is being inflexibly applied.
157
Recognizing Chinese walls as a defense to disqualification does not
mean accepting it under every circumstance. The propriety of Chinese
walls must be examined on a "case-by-case basis."'' 5 The merits of each
case, including the size of the firm, 159 the effectiveness of the wall itself,8 0
148. Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 453 (Newman, J., dissenting).
149. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
150. Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1302, supra note 1, at 6.
151. Armstrong, 625 F.2d at 445; see also Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1302, supra note
1, at 6 (citing Armstrong with approval).
152. Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1302, supra note 1; see supra note 44 and accompany-
ing text.
153. Id. at 4; see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
154. Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1302, supra note 1, at 5.
155. See supra note 8.
156. See Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 225 (6th Cir.
1988).
157. See Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. Cl. 1977) ("Where screening
is used it must ... be specific and inflexible.").
158. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
160. See Moser, supra note 9, at 410-11; Note, supra note 9, at 713.
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the ethical and policy considerations underlying disqualification rules,
and the need to limit their use, should be considered.'' This allows the
court to weigh the factors and determine whether the firm should be dis-
qualified, rather than requiring the "indiscriminate application of...
firm-disqualification rules."'' Further, recognizing the Chinese wall de-
fense simply means that the presumption of shared confidences may be
negated.'6 If the former client provides evidence that confidences have
been revealed, the wall is nullified and the firm will be disqualified.'6 4
VI. CONCLUSION
Vicarious disqualification rules designed to prevent the revelation of
former client confidences are obviously grounded upon strong ethical con-
siderations. However, strict application of these rules can lead to dire and
often unnecessary consequences for the current client, the firm itself, and
the judicial process. The ABA and several jurisdictions have recognized
the Chinese wall defense as a means for firms to avoid vicarious disquali-
fication in situations where a former government attorney moves to a pri-
vate firm and is disqualified from representing a particular client. Courts
and commentators now are seeking to apply the defense where an attor-
ney moves from one private firm to another.
Virginia should follow this legitimate trend and recognize the Chinese
wall defense in situations where a former government attorney is person-
ally disqualified. While not effective in all situations, a properly "built"
Chinese wall can help to prevent inadvertent sharing of confidences and
allow a firm to continue representing its current client. Looking at each
case individually, the courts can assess whether a firm should be disquali-
fied based on ethical and practical considerations. This process seems
both more fair and more efficient than an across-the-board disqualifica-
tion policy.
C. Randolph Sullivan
161. See Kesselhaut, 555 F.2d at 793 ("Each case depends on its own merits.").
162. Note, supra note 9, at 714.
163. See, e.g., Manning v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 225 (6th Cir.
1988) ("One method of rebutting the presumption is by demonstrating that specific institu-
tional screening mechanisms have been implemented ... ."); Note, supra note 9, at 691.
164. Note, supra note 9, at 691.
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